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We don't ignore price. 
Why do we ignore boilerplate contracts? 
I 
1\ 
ast year, I bought four computers. I didn't really 
need them. It's a long story. It's a story about 
the market, about contract law, and about the 
Power-or lack of power-of consumers like 
you and me. 
As Americans, we have great faith in the power of the 
free market. And rightly so. Adam Smith's invisible hand is an 
unTivaled engine of economic prosperity. Its genius lies in its 
decentralization, its reliance on the collective power of billions of 
private, individual decisions about what to sell, what to buy, and 
how much to pay. This decentralization ineans that if a seller sets 
its price too high (or makes its quality too low), the govern1nent 
does not have to do anything. The market will take care of it by 
driving consumers to a competing seller with a lower price (or 
higher quality). 
In theory, the invisible hand governs contracts as well, keep-
ing their terms competitive. Salary too low? Bargain with your 
employer by demonstrating that others would offer you more. 
Interested in buying that nite yeUow house with the picket fence? 
Once you remind the owner that"-there are other houses out there, 
you have the leverage to haggle over repairs, closing date, and 
whether the washer and dryer convey. 
But despite what we learn in law school about offer, counter-
offer, and the ineeting of the minds, the vast majority of consumer 
contracts are contracts of adhesion-standard-form boilerplate 
that consumers either accept or reject wholesale. 
In theory, this lack of negotiation presents no problem. So you 
can't bargain for different contract terms. So what? No one haggles 
with a supermarket cashier over the price of a loaf of bread, how 
thinly it is sliced, or whether it's covered by a warranty. If you don't 
like the pricing or the slicing, just take your business elsewhere. Our 
collective power as consumers drives unwanted terms out of the 
marketplace. Competition, not negotiation, is the answer. 
Like price, a contract term is just a feature of the transaction. 
If you don't like the contract, just walk away. When you walk 
away, you're signaling to the invisible hand to come down hard 
on that seller. 
But does the theory work in practice? Consider this: A couple 
of years ago, a British video game retailer hatched an April Fool's 
Day scheme. Buried deep in its online sales contract, to which 
customers had to agree when making a purchase, was the fol-
lowing term: "By placing an order via this Web 
site on the first day of the fourth month of 
the year 2010 Anno Domini, you agree 
to grant Us a non transferable option to 
claim, for now and for ever more, your 
itnmortal soul." 
1~he fine print described how the company 
could exercise its option, including serving notice 
1n 6 (six) foot high letters of fire." But if you were an atten-
tive customer and you wanted to hold onto your soul-or had 
"already given it to another party"-you could opt out of the 
provision by clicking a link. Those who did were rewarded with a 
discount offer and the chance to win free games. 
You can guess what happened. The vast majority of custom-
ers never clicked the link. ~fhey simply agreed to the entire con-
tract without reading it. 
We've all been there. We've all installed some new software 
on a computer or made a purchase on some website. Up pops a 
long, undifferentiated mass of legalese. Despite our legal training, 
what do we do? We breeze right past the terms, click on "I Agree," 
and get on with our lives. By doing so, we fail to send any signal 
to the marketplace about the content of the contract. 
Why don't we read these terms? Courts take them seriously, so 
why don't we? We don't ignore price. Why do we ignore contracts? 
Perhaps we're just lazy and get what we deserve when we 
become bound to contracts we never read. That's the attitude that 
contract law takes: As long as we have an opportunity to read, 
and we indicate our assent, the fact that we didn't read makes no 
difference to a court. 
But at a certain point, the failure to read may be more smart 
than slothful. If the boilerplate is too long or arrives too late in 
the transaction, the cost of reading and rejecting it may exceed 
the benefit-even if we don't like its terms. We may rationally 
decide to allocate our limited time and attention to something 
other than fine print. 
Which explanation is correct? Are we lazy, or are we smart? 
It's hard to answer that question in the abstract because some form 
contracts are shorter, more accessible, and easier to understand 
than others. It's a context-specific inquiry. And as I mulled over 
these issues last year, I found myself searching for a way to give 
the inquiry some context. 
So I bought four co1nputers. 
I bought one computer fi·om each of the top four sell-
ers of Windows-based systems (Acer, Dell, HP, and Toshiba). 
Together, they account for two-thirds of the domestic market. 
Through their websites, I ordered a basic unit with no extra bells 
and whistles, just the standard hardware and software included 
in the purchase price. 
Most of you have probably done something like this your-
selves. But then I did something you didn't. I paid attention to 
the boilerplate. In fact, I .kept track of every form contract to 
which I bec.lme bound in the course of these four 
transactions. Why? Because I wanted to measure the 
cost to the consumer of actually doing what the 
law thinks we should do: read all those tenns. 
My approach was conservative; I included 
only contracts to which I explicitly expressed 
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25 binding contracts totaling 
74.897words. 
Based on studies of 
reading rates of legal texts, 
the average reading time for 
74,897 
words of boilerplate 
would be just over 
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the same boilerplate, reading the various contracts 
of all four, plus analyzing and weighing their differences, 
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Now that you've read and compared boilerplate from 
four computers, send your signal to the marketplace. 
Select the computer 
with the best specs and 
most favorable terms, and 
register your rejection of 
the unfavorable boilerplate 
by returning the rejected 
computers. Then, hope for 
your refund. Good luck! 
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consent and whose terms were easy to locate.1 In other words, I 
included only contracts that a court would deafly enforce against me. 
The result? Even with my conservative approach, each 
purchase produced, on average, 25 binding contracts totaling 
74,897 words. To put that in perspective, it's just a tad fewer 
words than in the first Harry Potter book. Of course, Harry 
Potter is a page-turner, whereas boilerplate contracts are anything 
but. So perhaps a better analogy is tax forms: you could read 
every word of the instruction booklet for IRS Form 1040a, cover 
to cover, all 88 pages, and still be more than a thousand words 
short of the boilerplate total from a single computer purchase. 
(Or the truly masochistic can try reading a typical law review 
article, then reading it again, and then once more. Without skip-
ping the footnotes.) 
How long would it take the average consumer to read all 
those terms? Based on studies of reading rates of legal texts, the 
average reading time for 74,897 words of boilerplate would be 
just over seven hours. So if you want to send an informed signal 
to the marketplace about the tenns of computer contracts, set 
aside almost a full working day. And even at that slow rate, stud-
ies show that comprehension is pretty poor. 
But wait-computers are expensive. One should expect 
to spend some time checking them out before parting with so 
much money. I addressed this issue by expressing the consumer's 
burden in dollars per word. Even under this metric, the burden 
is high: 93 words per dollar spent. Imagine having to read 93 
words of boilerplate each time you buy a can of soda, 279 words 
when buying a $3 gallon of milk, or 5,580 words when filling a 
20-gallon tank with gas. 
What's more, these figures probably underestimate the cost 
to consumers of reading the fine print because competition 
works best when consumers can compare products. To really 
send an informed signal to the marketplace, a consumer would 
have to read the boilerplate from more than one product. Some 
contracts will be the same from seller to seller-for example, all 
four here use the same Wmdows license-but it would still take 
more than 15 hours just to read the various contracts of these 
four sellers, let alone the time it would talce to analyze and weigh 
their differences. 
And it gets worse. Of the 74,897 average words, only 7,698 
were presented to me before my purchase. That's about one in ten. 
The other 90 percent revealed themselves only after the computer 
arrived and I started it up. So if you really want to "shop" for boil-
erplate, you have to order multiple computers, await their arrival, 
start them all up, open the various programs, and then examine 
the boilerplate within. Only then could you register your rejection 
of boilerplate terms with the marketplace--e.g., by returning the 
rejected computers and receiving refunds. Good luck with that. 
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What does all this mean? With computer purchases, at least, 
it means that the cost of actually reading the fine print is so high 
that doing so is irrational; consumers who don't read are being 
smart, not lazy. Consequently, the market is doing nothing to 
regulate the terms of boilerplate. The market will respond if Dell 
charges a high price, but if Dell buries a pro-seller provision in 
its boilerplate (really just a subtle way of raising the price, right?), 
consumers will have no idea, and the market will not pressure 
Dell to remove it. And that means there's little reason to enforce 
the contract. 
Mine is not the only study that tracks the costs of reading 
contracts, although it is the only one that follows consumers all 
the way through a transaction. Despite the mounting evidence 
that consumers don't read, some scholars argue that boilerplate 
should be enforced. One theory is that some subset of consumers 
reads, and the readers can represent the rest of us. That some-
times happens-witness the recent public outcry over lnstagram's 
changes to its user terms-but those instances are very rare 
exceptions to the rule. Another theory is that these terms don't 
matter-that sellers ignore them juSt as much as consumers 
do-and that disputes are handled as customer service issues, not 
legal matters. But this argument proves too much; if that's the 
case, why bother with boilerplate terms at all? Why bother to pay 
attorneys to write them and Il)ake courts enforce them if no one 
cares about them? It would be cheaper. -~or seller and consumer 
alike to do away with them. 
No, the fact is that these terms do-'' matter. It's in the fine 
print that you promise to arbitrate ra~her th_an iitigate. It's in 
the fine print that you agree to pay Dell a restocking fee, allow 
Microsoft to share your private information, arid limit the rem-
edies you can claim against McAfee. It's in the fine print that you 
agree to waive participation in a class action suit. 
Reasonable people can disagree about whether waiving class 
actions or paying restocking fees is a good thing. But the whole 
point of the competitive free market is that we do not make these 
decisions for each other. Rather, each of us makes an individual 
decision, and the market responds accordingly. That almost 
never happens with consumer contracts. Their length and man-
ner of presentation actively discourage it. 
When we fail to read, we fail to malce individual decisions, 
and the market fails as well. Contract law needs to catch up with 
this reality. 
Jim Gibson is a professor and the director of the Intellectual 
Property Institute at Richmond Law. This article derives .from a 
publication, "Vertical Boiletplate, "forthcoming in Washington 
& Lee Law Review. 
